












   
R
o










Piazza della Pilotta, 4 – 00187 Roma (Italia)
gregorianum@unigre.it
GREGORIANUM
A quarterly, published by the Gregorian University.
Rivista trimestrale, edita dall’Università Gregoriana.
https://www.unigre.it/it/ricerca-e-pubblicazioni/riviste/gregorianum/
Editorial Board / Consiglio di Redazione 
 Henryk Pietras,  S.I., Direttore 
  Eleonora Fioravanti Cinci Agricola, Segretario di Redazione 
Sergio Bonanni – Simone D'Agostino – Ľuboš Rojka, S.I.
Mark Lewis, S.I. – Bryan Lobo, S.I. – Donna Orsuto
GREGORIAN & BIBLICAL PRESS
Piazza della Pilotta, 4 – 00187 Roma (Italia)
Tel. 066781567 –  066780588
E-mail: periodicals@biblicum.com
• Abbonamento cartaceo + on-line  € 115,00
• Abbonamento cartaceo   €   95,00
• Abbonamento on-line per utenti privati €   40,00
• Acquisto del singolo articolo on-line  €     9,00
• Paper subscription + digital subscription € 115,00
• Paper subscription    €   95,00
• Individual on-line digital subscription  €   40,00
• Each on-line issue    €     9,00
Scientific Board / Consiglio scientifico
Giampiero Basile, S.I. (Hochschule für Philosophie, München)
Waldemar Chrostowski (Uniwersytet Kardynała S. Wyszyńskiego, Warszawa)
Michael A. Conway (St Patrick’s College, Maynooth Co. Kildare, Ireland)
Angel Cordovilla Pérez (Universidad Pontificia Comillas, Madrid)
José Carlos Coupeau, S.I. (Universidad de Deusto, Bilbao)
Philip Endean, S.I. (Centre Sèvres, Paris)
Eduardo Fernandez, S.I. (Jesuit School of Theology at Berkeley)
José Granados (Pontificia Università Lateranense, Roma)
George Karuvelil, S.I. (Jnana Deepa Vidyapeeth, Pune, India)
Rafael Ramis-Barceló (Universitat de les Illes Balears, Palma de Mallorca)
André Wénin (Université Catholique de Louvain)
www.gbpress.org
Conto Corrente 100000006102 intestato a Pontificio Istituto Biblico
IBAN: IT81K0306909606100000006102  –  BIC: BCITITMM
Intesa SanPaolo Filiale  –  Fil accentrata TER S




On 29 June 2015, a twenty-two year old worker at the Frankfurt branch of a 
Volkswagen factory was killed by a robot1. This is not the only case of a person 
being seriously injured or killed by a robot. Who is responsible when such 
things happen? Given that nowadays robots have decision-making capabilities 
dependent on pattern recognition and prior experience, some people are 
convinced that in such incidents the one we should hold responsible is the 
robot. Does this make sense? Is it just a move to facilitate legal procedures? A 
few months after that Frankfurt incident, and probably partly as a consequence, 
the Committee on Legal Affairs for the European Parliament produced a Draft 
Report, dated 31 May 2016, in which we find the proposal that robots be 
recognized as legal persons. In its exact wording, the proposal was to create «a 
specific legal status for robots so that at least the most sophisticated autonomous 
robots could be established as having the status of electronic persons with 
specific rights and obligations»2. On 16 February 2017, the European Parliament 
adopted this proposal as a Resolution on Civil Law Rules of Robotics. The 
resolution represents a new extension of the notion of legal personhood and, 
if approved as law, would probably have very significant consequences for the 
future. The entire issue deals not only with the level of machine sophistication 
but also with our own self-understanding. The questions it raises branch out in 
various directions, involving neuroscience, cognitive science, philosophy of 
mind, ethics, legal theory, and even theological anthropology. 
In recent decades, research in artificial intelligence and robotics has had, 
in fact, a significant impact on philosophy, social sciences, legal theory, and 
moral theology. Researchers have studied the implications from various 
angles. The Vatican as well has contributed to these studies especially through 
two high profile workshops organized jointly by the Pontifical Academy of 
1 «Roboter tötet Arbeiter bei VW in Baunatal», Frankfurter Allegemeine, 01.07.2015.
2 Committee on Legal Affairs for the European Parliament, Draft Report (Mady Delvaux, 
Rapporteur), p. 12 (Retrieved from <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/JU-
RI-PR-582443_EN.pdf>.
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Sciences and the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences. The first one was on 
the Power and Limits of Artificial Intelligence (30 November–1 December 
2016) and the second on Robotics, AI and Humanity, Science, Ethics and 
Policy (16-17 May 2019)3. In all these studies, a number of philosophers 
and legal scholars have focused on the specific question of attributing legal 
personhood to sophisticated machines but one area remains somewhat 
ignored, namely the semantic dimension of the problem. This paper will 
attempt to make a contribution in this area. The general aim is to examine this 
complex problem by determining what is happening at the level of meaning 
and of logical consistency within our understanding. The paper has three 
parts. The first presents the relevant historical background, with particular 
reference to philosophy of mind and cognitive neuroscience. The second 
part reviews the current debate as regards the applicability of legal status to 
intelligent machines. The third section then pushes the debate a little forward 
by exploring the neglected area of semantics. Overall, the main question will 
be the following. What is happening at the level of meaning when we try to 
attribute legal personhood to an intelligent machine, and what insights can 
we gain by studying the issue at this semantic level?
At the very start however, it is useful to clarify the distinction between 
robotics and artificial intelligence. In this paper, robotics will be taken to 
refer to the area of engineering that deals with the construction of finely 
controlled structures in view of performing some desired physical task, such 
as metallic grasping mechanisms, arms, or mobility devices. In this sense, 
what robotics produces, namely robots, are artificial instruments at the 
service of humans, devices that sometimes enjoy some autonomous capacity 
for social interaction among humans4. Artificial intelligence will be taken to 
refer to the branch of cognitive science that deals with the construction of 
machines that simulate not human physical abilities but mental capacities 
like calculation, speech-recognition, learning and problem solving. To refer 
to the collaborative product of these two disciplines, the paper will use the 
expression intelligent machines. 
3 See A.M. Battro – S. Dehaene, ed., Power and limits of artificial intelligence: The proceedings 
of the Workshop on «Power and limits of artificial intelligence», Città del Vaticano 2017. For the 
final statement of the 2019 workshop, see <http://www.pas.va/content/accademia/en/events/2019/
robotics.html>.
4 The social interaction of robots with humans is very important. It has an impact on how we 
describe them. Apart from taking them to be servants, we can take them to be companions, objects of 
entertainment, therapeutic instruments for old people or autistic children, and so on. This interaction 
determines also the extent to which we attribute emotions to robots. For a philosophical assessment 




The relation between the mind and the body has been the object of 
philosophical and religious speculation for centuries, probably since the dawn 
of history. One might conjecture that very early humans started to assume the 
existence of immaterial souls because of the experience of dreaming about 
their deceased loved ones. Plato, in his book Phaedo, famously defended a 
clear distinction between soul and body, considering the latter a kind of prison 
from which the former seeks liberation. The body is corruptible but the soul, 
since it grasps mathematical and other kinds of necessary truths, is immortal. 
His student Aristotle adopted a different method and drew inspiration from 
biology. He saw the relation between soul and body as a special case of the 
more general relation between form and matter, between mover and moved. 
He recognized from the start that the question of the soul’s location within the 
body is misguided. Soul, being the form of the natural body or «the principle 
of animal life»5 has no specific location within the body. In this sense, form is 
similar to shape. It makes no sense to ask, «Where is the shape of your face 
located?» The shape of the face is the face. To have a soul is not to possess 
something or to be related to something but to be, to exist, in a specific way. 
Notice therefore how Aristotle’s analysis of the soul was primarily conceptual, 
not empirical. For him, the soul was certainly not some material constituent 
of the person6. 
A major turning point occurred in the seventeenth century through of the 
work of René Descartes who proposed that, as regards explanation, we need 
to assume that non-human animals are machines. Humans on the contrary 
are made up of two kinds of substance: the extended type, the machine, and 
the thinking type, the mind. For Descartes, humans are completely conscious 
of the contents of their minds and have infallible access to this content via 
introspection. In spite of these clear distinctions, Descartes saw that naïve 
dualism could not be the right answer as regards humans. Human reality is 
more complicated. He wrote, for instance: «nature […] teaches me that […] 
I am not only lodged in my body as a pilot in his vessel, but that, apart from 
5 aristotle, De Anima, tr. J.A. Smith, 402a7-8, in R. mckeon, ed., The Basic Works of Aristotle, 
New York 1941, 535.
6 Although «soul» and «mind» are nowadays often used interchangeably, it is important to 
recall the Aristotelian-Thomistic important distinctions. These can be summarized briefly as 
follows. The «soul» refers to the principle of autonomous motion of organisms, whether these 
organisms are human or not. In other words, «soul» refers to the principle of movement, «body» 
to what moves. Saying that there is a variety of living things is the same as saying that there 
are many kinds of soul. One kind is the human soul, called a rational soul. Two main faculties 
characterize the rational soul: the mind and the will. The mind seeks the truth; the will seeks 
the good.
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this, I am so closely united and intermingled with it that I compose with it 
one whole»7. In spite of this warning however, his distinctions took root in 
academia and brought forth a form of science-inspired dualism that is still 
with us today.
Consider for instance the development of neuroscience from the eighteenth 
century onwards. One of Descartes’s conjectures was that the crucial location 
where the non-material mind interacts with the body was the part of the brain 
called the pineal gland. Descartes’s interest in this question represents a new 
research project, namely the project of determining those parts of the brain 
that are responsible for specific intellectual or physical activities. Eventually 
this project came to be called the theory of Cortical Localization. The first 
attempt to map the brain in this way could not, of course, resort to human 
vivisection. It started rather by assuming that the localization of mental 
function resulted in outward physical manifestations. Researchers like Franz 
Joseph Gall (1758-1828), the originator of the now obsolete discipline of 
phrenology, assumed that bumps on the skull correspond to specific mental 
capacities, some enhanced more than others in line with the character of 
the individual person. This idea of external manifestation was eventually 
disproved. Nevertheless the determination of cortical localization remained 
a rewarding research project. The fine structure of the cerebral cortex was 
eventually mapped and our knowledge of the function of cortical sites became 
increasingly specific, arriving even to the identification of those parts of the 
brain that are responsible for the movement of just one finger8. Advancing 
further in microscopic brain anatomy, neuroscientists discovered the structure 
and function of the specialized cell of the brain, the neuron. A very significant 
point here is that, as opposed to the higher-level localization of the brain, 
we find no localization at the neuron-level. In other words, we find no one-
one correspondence between neuron and brain function. And certainly none 
between neuron and bodily function. We find rather collaboration of many 
neurons, or cell-assemblies, for any specific function. To explain brain 
anatomy at the cell-level therefore, we need a holistic approach. 
Up to now, this quick historical overview has highlighted the path of 
inquiry regarding the study of the brain’s role in human physical and mental 
functions. This is however not the only line of inquiry worth mentioning 
7 René Descartes, Meditation VI : «La nature m’enseigne […] que je ne suis pas seulement 
logé dans mon corps, ainsi qu’un pilote en son navire, mais outre cela, que je lui sois conjoint 
tres-étroittement & tellement confondu & meslé, que je compose comme un seul tout avec lui.», 
in C. aDam – P. tannery, ed., Œuvres de Descartes, IX, Paris 1996, 64; my translation.
8 For a good overview, see Z. FolzenloGen – D. ormonD, «A brief history of cortical functional 
localization and its relevance to neurosurgery», Neurosurgical Focus 47/3:E2 (2019). DOI: 
10.3171/2019.6.FOCUS19326
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here. There is another long line of inquiry regarding simulation. The main 
question in this second line of inquiry has been, «How can we simulate what 
humans do intellectually?» Simulation starts with the construction of simple 
instruments, for instance the construction of a spade that, in a sense, simulates 
and extends our capacity to dig with our hands. As regards thinking, the first 
steps were taken in ancient times with the construction of instruments that 
help calculation, like the abacus. Progress continued with the construction of 
sophisticated mechanical adding machines, like Blaise Pascal’s mechanical 
calculator invented in the early seventeenth century. With the advent of 
electronics, the second half of the twentieth century saw the rapid development 
of digital computers. Current machines can simulate many human intellectual 
abilities. They can respond correctly to human speech, compete successfully 
in high-level strategic games like chess, operate cars autonomously, and so on. 
Where are we today? The question regarding legal personhood attribution to 
machines emerges forcefully because intelligent machines have now become 
capable of simulating more and more human intellectual skills. Consider 
for instance two impressive and significant areas of current development in 
artificial intelligence. 
The first one concerns expert systems. These are software-designs that 
simulate not just a normal human person of average intelligence but the expert. 
They simulate the expert’s ability to offer a dependable judgement regarding 
a specific course of action to be taken. They thus simulate the person who is 
capable of making a valuable judgement because of his or her long experience. 
The machine can simulate this by referring to a vast amount of stored data. 
In a sense, like a human being, it can experience, understand and then judge. 
This artificial capability became possible primarily when researchers started 
to model the machine hardware on the brain’s neuronal structure9. They called 
the new structure an artificial neural network. We can think of an artificial 
neural network as a number of points in space with connections between them. 
The points, or units of the network, are simple processors and are usually 
situated in a number of distinct layers. The connections between units of one 
layer with units of the next layer are extremely numerous and are not all of the 
same strength. Information passes from one layer to another, from processor 
to processor, but the itinerary of information as it passes through the entire 
network is not linear. It is not along a single line made up of connections 
from one node to another node to another node, and so on. On the contrary, 
information is spread out. It is distributed. It passes along various connection 
pathways involving many nodes at the same time. 
9 Warren McCulloch and Walter Pitts are the recognized pioneers in this area, especially with 
their paper, W. mcculloch W. Pitts «A Logical Calculus of Ideas Immanent in Nervous Acti-
vity», Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics 5/4 (1943) 115–133. DOI:10.1007/BF02478259
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This kind of parallel distributed programming has very interesting properties. 
For instance, the input layer and the output layer are connected to the outside 
world, precisely because the former receives the information and the latter delivers 
it. The layers in between, however, are not. Engineers who construct the network 
never know for sure what is happening within these hidden intermediate layers. 
Moreover, this kind of distributed programming can simulate high-level human 
intellectual abilities such as learning. We use the expression «machine learning» 
when the networks program themselves for some specific task. Engineers will 
give the network a training period during which they expose it to a sample of 
input-output pairs. For example, a network may be given the chance to learn how 
to recognize words as they are spoken by a person with a particular accent and then 
to write these words on a screen. In this case, the training period consists of the 
person reading a standard text into the system. The standard text constitutes a set 
of input-output pairs to standardize the network. The network then can work and 
expand its detecting ability on its own. It can «learn on its own». The significant 
point for us in this paper is that the engineers who build the network will never 
know exactly how its hidden layers become standardized for that specific task10. 
The second point that deserves our attention deals with artificial life. While 
artificial intelligence simulates our mental functions, artificial life simulates the 
entire evolutionary process by which various biological species have emerged. 
In the work of John von Neumann towards the mid-1900s, we already find the 
hypothesis that not only intelligence but also life itself could be abstracted, as 
it were, from organisms. Once abstracted, it could be realized elsewhere using 
artificial structures11. The first step is to define life within a computer system. 
We define it as a set of rules that determine how a particular code self-replicates. 
When the code is executed, in other words, when the instruction is followed, we 
can say that the artificial organism lives. The self-replication allows some random 
changes that, through repeated iterations, could produce new stable codes. These 
stable mutants could generate other stable mutants, and the process could branch 
off and continue to self-replicate in various unpredictable directions. Notice 
that we are here not simulating the functionality of just one organism. We are 
simulating the species itself, together with the possible transformations it could 
undergo in the course of time. We can likewise simulate the various kinds of 
animal social behavior, like the swarming intelligence of flocks of birds or the 
optimization behavior we see in ant colonies. As in the previous point, we see 
again how researchers are now building and exploring systems that, in a sense, are 
unpredictable. We could say that these artificial systems have a life of their own.
10 For a historical overview, see R.M. harnish, Minds, Brains, Computers: An Historical 
Introduction to the Foundations of Cognitive Science, Malden, Mass. – Oxford 2001, part III.
11 John von Neumann developed his innovative views in a set of lectures that were eventually 
published in A.W. Burks, ed., Theory of Self-Reproducing Automata, Urbana – London 1966.
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ii. machines anD Persons
Machine expertise and machine life are developments that have greatly 
encouraged people to describe machines by using specifically human 
personal attributes. Without any hesitation, we now describe a computer as 
remembering, thinking, understanding or deciding. Apparently, the fact that 
such verbs are attributable to humans, and only rarely to some animals, does 
not worry us. In our vocabulary, machines have now qualified, as it were, 
from mere things to being autonomous agents. This new status of the machine 
has important consequences as regards responsibility. I started this paper by 
recalling the sad incident of the worker who was killed by a robot. Had the 
man been killed accidentally by a falling branch during a storm, we would not 
hold anyone responsible. But because the killing was caused by an entity that 
enjoyed a certain degree of independence, we are tempted, or even obliged, to 
see the killing as caused by an agent. No one knows what was going on inside 
its circuitry, not even its creators. The machine therefore enjoyed a certain 
degree of privacy and autonomy12. This seems to indicate that it should be held 
responsible. We are entitled or even obliged to attribute to it not only human 
features like remembering, understanding and deciding but also a human 
status with respect to the law. 
What is at stake here? The idea of a legal person is not new. It arose from the 
awareness that a combined group of people could in certain circumstances act 
in a way that is impossible for any of its members on his or her own13. Because 
of this, the law could recognize the group as a legal entity or a legal person. 
On this point, jurisdictions are not in full agreement, and the difference can 
be somewhat surprising. For instance the juridical system in India recognizes 
as legal persons not only groups of people or corporations but also some idols 
12 Autonomy in this context just means that the machine is capable of establishing its own 
criteria for choosing to follow one rule rather than another, and to proceed this way at various 
stages of its functioning. The machine’s overall behavior thus becomes something that had not 
been included in its original programing. This idea of autonomy is very superficial when compared 
to views that are more in line with human moral experience. Immanuel Kant, for instance, called 
the rational will autonomous because it operates by responding to what it considers to be reasons. 
Consciousness is therefore essential. Humans are autonomous because they act under the idea 
of their own freedom, responding to laws that they themselves lay down for themselves. See 
especially I. kant, Groundwork of the metaphysic of morals, tr. H.J. Paton, New York 1964.
13 This description is from p. 133 of an early study: G.F. Deiser, «The Juristic Person I», 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review and American Law Register 57/3 (48 New Series) 
(1908) 131-142. Examples of well-documented recent studies include D. FaGunDes, «Note, 
what we talk about when we talk about persons: The language of a legal fiction», Harvard Law 
Review 114/6 (2001) 1745-1768; N. naFFine, «Who Are Law’s Persons? From Cheshire Cats to 
Responsible Subjects», The Modern Law Review 66/3 (2003) 346-367.
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of Hinduism. The idea of idols as legal persons works well because there is a 
human person who has the idol in his or her charge, who is in law the idol’s 
manager, and who attends to its interests14. Of course, a legal person is a legal 
fiction. We use it because it facilitates legal reasoning. We should not forget 
however that, as a fiction, it could function well in some areas and not so well 
in others. The insufficiency of the idea often emerges when things go wrong 
and we need to ask, «Who is responsible for the damage done?» For lack of 
space, I will focus on one important area only: the link between responsibility 
and autonomy.
In what sense could a machine be responsible before the law? Responsibility 
and autonomy go hand in hand. Consider for instance the case of robots or 
drones used in war. In the near future, highly sophisticated autonomous war-
machines will probably be entrusted with decisions about target-identification 
and destruction. Increasing machine autonomy in warfare could push humans 
out of the picture completely. Technological progress is enhancing the speed of 
machine decision-making. When the autonomous weapon system’s decision-
making speed exceeds that of humans, the only way to defend oneself against 
it will be to oppose it with another autonomous weapon system. The fighting 
will be entirely «in the hands» of machines because the side that decides to 
retain human control would lose out15. We all agree that many humans are 
involved in the manufacture and the initiation of such intelligent machines. 
Nevertheless, if we accept that the machine enjoys a degree of autonomy, we 
cannot automatically hold these humans responsible for the machine’s action. 
The higher the degree of machine-autonomy, the less justification we have for 
holding one of these people responsible. 
Notice how we reason in the same way when dealing with children. We hold 
parents responsible for minor children, those who enjoy limited autonomy. 
When children grow up, they become autonomous, and hence the parents are 
not responsible any longer. The degree of autonomy therefore determines who 
is responsible, and this principle seems applicable to intelligent machines. Of 
14 The idol’s manager is analogous to the manager of the estate of an infant heir. See S.M. solaiman, 
«Legal personality of robots, corporations, idols and chimpanzees: a quest for legitimacy», Artificial 
Intelligence and Law 25/2 (2017) 155-179. 
15 See R. sParrow, «Killer Robots», Journal of Applied Philosophy 24/1 (2007) 62-77. We may 
be tempted to say that, if fully autonomous intelligent machines will really pose a danger to humans, 
«the solution is not to create them in the first place» (quoting from p. 1261 of L.B. solum, «Legal 
Personhood for Artificial Intelligences», North Carolina Law Review 70/4 [1992] 1231-1287). This 
is not a convincing option. Human social reality is very complex. Some people will want to create 
intelligent machines, attribute legal personhood to them, and use them in war, simply to gain power 
over other humans. The source of evil lies in the human heart, which is opportunistic and resourceful 
even as regards evil. It is enough to recall how terrorism and corruption have benefitted greatly from 
enhanced social media.
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course, we are not saying here that minor-children are not persons until they 
grow up. We are exploring how we attribute responsibility, and it seems that 
we sometimes resort, consciously or unconsciously, to the idea of quasi-agent. 
Although the law does not explicitly say so, it considers minor children as 
quasi-agents. They do not enjoy the full rights of personhood. They cannot for 
instance sign a contract. Nevertheless, they are protected just like adults. Legal 
agency, therefore, can apply in an attenuated form to entities that fall short of 
personhood in the full sense. Applying this idea to intelligent machines, some 
argue that, even if technical progress will never reproduce a fully-fledged 
person, we may still eventually arrive at a situation in which machines will be 
quasi-agents in the legal sense16. 
The basic point therefore seems to be that the concepts of personal agency, 
responsibility and autonomy allow for degrees. Admittedly, we often assume 
that personal agency is either present or absent. We often assume that it is 
present when the entities that caused the action are fully autonomous. This 
allows us to hold them responsible. It is absent when the entities that caused 
the actions are causally determined, when the entities enjoy no or very little 
autonomy, like non-human animals or minor children. This assumption 
however neglects the fact that, even with no reference to intelligent machines, 
we sometimes acknowledge an intermediate conceptual space between 
autonomous and non-autonomous entities. This space is occupied by entities 
that are partially autonomous. An entity can be called partially autonomous 
when those who launch it into action know clearly what ends the entity is 
meant to achieve but they cannot foresee the action that the entity will use 
to achieve that end17. Child soldiers are a prime example of such partially 
autonomous or quasi-autonomous agents. The international criminal court, in 
determining responsibility for war crimes, distinguishes between child soldiers 
and adult soldiers precisely because of this quasi-autonomy of children. We 
16 For instance P.M. asaro, «Robots and Responsibility from a Legal Perspective», Proceedings 
of the IEEE (2007) 20-24. On the issue of responsibility in general, and how it could be applicable 
to animals and very young children, see J.M. Fischer – M. ravizza, Responsibility and Control: 
a theory of moral responsibility, Cambridge 1998.
17 The idea of ends is important. In general, when things go wrong as regards a product of 
human technology, we could argue in terms of the ends of the machine and of negligence on the 
part of the user or on the part of the manufacturer. For instance, when a toy robot causes harm, 
we could prosecute the manufacturers not for the ends the robot was meant to achieve but for 
negligence in so far as they did not warn of potential hazards. With intelligent machines, the 
issue becomes more complicated because the effects are much more difficult to foresee. See 
asaro, «Robots and Responsibility» (cf. nt. 16). On computers and quasi-responsibility, see 
B.C. stahl, «Responsible computers? A case for ascribing quasi-responsibility to computers 
independent of personhood or agency», Ethics and Information Technology 8/4 (2006) 205-
213; DOI: 10.1007/s10676-006-9112-4
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could argue therefore that, to determine the responsibility for damage caused 
by an intelligent machine used as a weapon, we would need to resort to this 
intermediate conceptual space. We would consider autonomous weapon 
systems as cases analogous to child soldiers18. 
Is the idea of punishment relevant here? For some researchers, attributing 
legal personhood to a machine does not make sense even if we were to hold 
it responsible. The main reason is that the machine cannot be punished19. For 
punishment to be possible, the subject needs to have a moral psychology that 
is open to the burdens of duties and temptations. Corporations do qualify 
but only in the sense that the punishment transfers to the punishment of the 
owners of the corporation. Corporations have a clear objective, namely to 
make a profit in line with the needs and aspirations of the owners. Intelligent 
machines however do not seem to have any real, intrinsic objective that could 
allow us to apply the idea of punishment. Including a punishment module 
within the circuitry would not count. 
Does this brief overview of the main arguments allows us to detect any general 
trend? I started my paper by quoting from the 2016 proposal at the European 
Parliament, where we find the suggestion that the law should start recognizing 
a specific legal status for robots. The debate so far has not made it clear how 
the granting of legal personhood to intelligent machines could be of benefit. 
The 2016 proposal and its eventual adoption as a Resolution in fact created a 
robust reaction from political leaders, researchers in artificial intelligence and 
robotics, industry leaders, physical and mental health specialists, and experts 
in law and ethics. A joint statement with more than 150 signatories expressed 
a strong opposition to the conferring of any form of legal status to intelligent 
machines20. The argument depends on two main points. First, the proposal to 
confer legal status to robots was founded on the idea that in the near future 
«damage liability would be impossible to prove». According to them, this is 
totally incorrect. Secondly, the proposal errs because of «an overvaluation of 
actual capacities of even the most advanced robots». This overvaluation is the 
result of science fiction and sensational press releases21. The signatories of this 
18 This argument is developed further in R. sParrow, «Killer Robots» (cf. nt. 15). Notice that 
relatively recent philosophical reflection in the area of animal rights could perhaps give us some 
ground for speculation on the attribution of moral rights to intelligent machines. See for example, 
D.J. calverley, «Android science and animal rights, does an analogy exit?», Connection science 
18/4 (2006) 403-417; DOI: 10.1080/09540090600879711. The divergence between animals and 
intelligent machines however is considerable. Fruitful analogical thinking here is possible only 
when we clarify the underlying semantic issues.
19 For an example of such reasoning, see L.B. solum, «Legal Personhood» (cf. nt. 13).
20 The open letter is available online, from which the quotations in this paragraph are taken: 
<http://www.robotics-openletter.eu/>.
21 Popular literature has grossly exaggerated the advances in machine intelligence. So-called 
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open letter express their expert judgement that all intelligent machines, even 
when very sophisticated, make decisions that can always be traced back to 
human agents as regards responsibility. They claim therefore that «creating a 
legal status of electronic ‘person’ would be ideological and non-sensical and 
non-pragmatic»22. 
This strong criticism reveals how, behind the proposal to attribute legal 
personhood to robots, there could be a hidden political agenda. Hidden 
agendas in such situations are not new. The classic author Suetonius mentions 
in his work Lives of the Twelve Caesars that Emperor Caligula planned to 
make his horse Incitatus a consul. Caligula did this probably to ridicule the 
senate, realizing thereby what is probably the earliest case of a politically 
motivated attempt to confer legal personhood to a non-human entity. Today’s 
analogue is Sophia, the humanoid robot, with a pretty woman’s face, who was 
granted citizenship by Saudi Arabia in October 201723. This was politically 
motivated, just like Caligula’s proposal. In spite of the fact that experts 
have harshly discredited Sophia, the human face and the woman’s name 
have subliminal effects on the public. In such cases, it is always important 
to uncover the ideological and political undercurrents. Some scientists and 
electronic engineers seek to create a split between their new use of some key 
words and the standard use of those same words. They do this because such 
a split allegedly reveals the brilliance, the novelty and the relevance of their 
work. For some people, one social desideratum of neuroscience, a condition 
for its progress and of its public acceptability, seems to be precisely this kind 
of disturbing novelty. The idea of research impact, so crucial for attracting 
funding, is related to the degree of revolutionary noise that the research will 
produce. The hidden political agenda may include other desires as well, for 
instance the desire to gain worldwide prominence within social media, to 
generate awe and submission before the power of information technology, 
to alienate the public from serious issues, or simply to discredit traditional 
values. The most dangerous element of the hidden political agenda in this 
expert systems do indeed have some capacity for dealing with novel situations that had not been 
included in the initial programming. Nevertheless, the capacity for dealing with complex novelty 
is not within reach. Solum argues in «Legal Personhood» (cf. nt. 13) that an intelligent machine 
can achieve a human-like competence as regards dealing with novelty, but this competence will be 
limited to one sector only. Serious novel situations, like those faced by humans, require expertise 
in many sectors.
22 See also S. wettiG – E. zehenDner, «A legal analysis of human and electronic agents», 
Artificial Intelligence and Law 12 (2004) 111–135; this paper offers a useful study comparing 
the idea of electronic person in US, Canadian, and German law.
23 These cases are discussed in U. PanGallo, «Vital, Sophia, and Co.—The Quest for the Le-
gal Personhood of Robots», Information 9 (2018) 230, Special Issue Roboethics; DOI: 10.3390/
info9090230
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context is the desire to create ways for exonerating humans from liability in 
situations when robots cause harm. When the event involves an intelligent 
machine, the temptation is to distribute responsibility in a way that avoids the 
just punishment due to humans. Such a temptation should be resisted. The 
correct strategy is to determine the human origin of the harm done. When a 
robot causes harm and we cannot identify a scientific reason for the robot’s 
malfunction or misuse, it makes no sense to blame the machine. We should 
rather seek to compensate the harm by some kind of mandatory insurance 
system24. 
iii. semantic issues
Let us now try to unveil what is happening at the deeper semantic level. In 
these debates, we rightly assume that personhood, at least in the legal sense, 
means the capacity to enjoy rights and perform duties. We assume also that, 
for these capacities, one needs awareness and free will. Since intelligent 
machines have no capacity for awareness, we conclude that attributing legal 
personhood to them is incorrect25. Can a philosophical opponent challenge 
this reasoning? Suppose engineers will add some new sophisticated module to 
intelligent machines and then announce that, by convention, the meaning of 
«capacity for awareness» should include also such machines with this added 
unit. Should we accept this?
To answer this question in the light of recent philosophical advances 
regarding the theory of meaning, it seems best to start with the collaborative 
work of Max R. Bennett, a neuroscientist, and Peter M. S. Hacker, a prominent 
Wittgenstein scholar. These two authors have raised very serious doubts about 
the way some cognitive neuroscientists and artificial intelligence engineers are 
using personal attributes to describe their observations and achievements26. 
The problem is semantic. The basic starting point is that the meaning of a 
word is not arbitrary. A word’s meaning is its specific use within the complex 
social life of language users. This use is governed by rules. Consider the 
analogy between language and the game of chess. The chess pieces are used 
24 This is Solaiman’s recommendation, «Legal personality» (cf. nt. 14). Of course, if we can 
identify a scientific reason, we should hold liable the legal person who was the manufacturer or the 
legal person who was the user, or both. For more on the legal problems regarding responsibility 
attribution in this context, see S. Beck, «The problem of ascribing legal responsibility in the 
case of robotics», AI & Society 31 (2016) 473-481; DOI: 10.1007/s00146-015-0624-5.
25 This point is made in S.M. solaiman, «Legal personality» (cf. nt. 14).
26 M.R. Bennett – P.M.S. hacker, Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, Malden, 
Mass. – Oxford 2003.
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according to rules, rules that determine the game. For the game to be possible, 
the rules need to be fixed and accepted by both players. The same happens in 
language. The rules of grammar determine the correct use of words. These 
rules do not determine what is said but are accepted by all language-users 
for language to be possible. Now the specific problem related to machine 
intelligence arises because some important verbs like «desiring», «intending», 
«thinking» and «understanding» function fully and correctly only when their 
subject is a human person. In spite of this, some cognitive neuroscientists 
and artificial intelligence engineers freely use these verbs when the subject is 
just the brain or just a computer. Bennett and Hacker show convincingly that 
this incorrect use causes confusion. They start from the obvious point that, to 
attribute a specific thought to someone, we resort to that person’s behavior 
characteristics. When that person’s behavior is of a certain kind, for instance, 
when she picks up her umbrella before going out for a walk, then we rightly 
say, «She thinks it might rain». These behavioral features are part of the very 
complex social interaction of the person with the environment, an interaction 
that might also include role-play and deception. Of course, a brain, as distinct 
from the person, cannot show any such behavioral features. Brains as such do 
not move around. They are not socially engaged. Admittedly, the brain may 
have some features that depend on whether that person thinks it might rain 
or not. But the one who thinks is the entire person not just the brain. First, 
we determine what the person thinks and then we study the brain, not the 
other way round. In spite of these fundamental principles, many cognitive 
neuroscientists still describe the results of their research by speaking about the 
brain’s thinking and reasoning, about one hemisphere’s knowing something 
and not informing the other hemisphere, and so forth27. 
When cognitive neuroscientists do this, they assume that we could separate 
the concept of person, with all its connotations regarding thinking, reasoning, 
and understanding, from the social relationality this concept involves. This 
assumption however cannot but lead to confusion, precisely because the 
concept of person is essentially connected to relationality. When faced with 
the question whether an entity before us is a person or not, we need first to 
apply biological criteria, to ascertain that we are dealing with a genuine living 
27 In P.M.S. hacker, Wittgenstein: meaning and mind, Malden, Mass. – Oxford 2003 1990, 
162, we find the following two expressions: «Hush, I’m thinking!» and «Hush, my brain is 
thinking; in a moment it’ll tell me what needs to be done, and then I’ll let you know!» Hacker 
of course condemns the latter expression as non-sense. Indeed, we feel that it is a twisted use of 
words, intended as a joke. We use it to enjoy the surprising breach in meaning that it produces. 
Notice how the case of Sophia the intelligent robot is similar. Sophia is a joke, a work of art, 
an artifact to stimulate an audience, touching onlookers in areas of feeling and experience they 
had never explored before.
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thing. Then we apply intelligence criteria to ascertain that we are dealing 
with an intelligent organism. Finally, we need to apply personhood criteria, 
to see whether we are dealing with a personal organism or another form 
of intelligent organism. And especially this latter step involves observing 
the kind of social relations that organism has with others28. Using Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s vocabulary, we could express the same point by saying that 
words like «aware» or «conscious» are attributes that depend on the form of 
life. A computer does not have a form of life. Someone may object by saying 
that machines nowadays can indeed include processes that correspond to 
human behavior. Some machines can make use of biological material together 
with some form of metabolism. More in line with intelligence, they can answer 
questions typed on a screen, or spoken into a microphone, and therefore these 
machines do resemble the human form of life. But this resemblance is minimal 
when compared to the vast array of social behaviors that we need as a criterion 
for the correct use of important words like «awareness» or «consciousness».
The idea of resemblance here is very important. How close to ours must 
the form of life of a non-human entity be for that entity to deserve the status 
of personhood? Our recognition of resemblance is a complex process. It 
involves holistic perception and does not always imply prior knowledge 
of precise necessary and sufficient conditions. Wittgenstein’s expression 
«family-resemblance» is very appropriate because it highlights how we 
recognize resemblance in a holistic fashion and not point by point. A lack 
of resemblance as regards one aspect may be compensated by resemblance 
as regards another29. The classic Turing test involves resemblance as regards 
linguistic skill only. The machine is designed to generate human-like responses 
for questions set by an evaluator. If the evaluator cannot tell the machine 
from the human, the machine is said to have passed the test. The machine is 
said to merit the attribute «intelligent». Is it not obvious however, that this 
is a very reductionist approach? From the innumerable behavior patterns 
that characterize human rationality, we pick just one element. And this leads 
inevitably to bias in our conclusion. To avoid this, we need to adopt a holistic 
approach, one that considers not only linguistic skills but also all other kinds 
28 Here I am focusing on corporeal persons. I am assuming that we can correctly use the 
expression «non-corporeal person» to the extent that what we seek to describe shares the core, 
significant features that we are acquainted with when dealing with corporeal persons, features 
like individuality, intellect and will. This extended use of «person» beyond material conditions, 
however, is beyond the scope of this paper.
29 Hence we must be careful not be too essentialistic in our investigation concerning legal 
personhood. Solum (cf. nt. 13) for instance adopts a typically essentialistic attitude by seeking 
the essence of personhood, in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, and then tries to 
apply this essence to intelligent machines. This approach may indeed be inevitable for legal 
reasoning but it does not correspond to what happens in real life.
607ELECTRONIC PERSONS?
of behavior, including thereby the entire form of life. This is what «family-
resemblance» involves. As things are today, an intelligent machine may indeed 
pass the Turing Test but still fail to pass the family-resemblance test. It will 
not pass because it does not behave like an intelligent organism in the broad 
sense. Consider how our understanding functions as regards living things, for 
instance dogs. Since dogs can neither read, write nor speak, they will certainly 
not pass the Turing Test. They are therefore definitely unlike humans. Their 
outward behavior however compensates for this lack of resemblance. That is 
why we rightly attribute to them some personal attributes, in a derived sense, 
and can even understand what they communicate with their various sounds30. 
Of course, if a non-biological entity, like a sophisticated humanoid robot, will 
start behaving like us not only in a restricted linguistic sense but also over a 
very broad range of social behavior patterns, then we could perhaps decide to 
call it a living thing31. Notice however that this would not be a discovery but 
a decision. Moreover, to produce a thinking machine that could deserve our 
calling it a person we need to start with producing animality first, and then we 
could perhaps arrive at rationality32.
30 Self-awareness (or self-consciousness) does not involve awareness of a self. A «self» is 
not a thing. We call non-human animals conscious in a derived sense, suggested by their non-
linguistic behavior. It is incorrect to claim that self-consciousness is nothing more than a kind 
of self-scanning device. The idea of form of life is now recognized as crucial by a number of 
researchers, e.g. A. kern, «Human Life and Self-consciousness. The Idea of ‘Our’ Form of 
Life in Hegel and Wittgenstein», in C. martin, ed., Language, Form(s) of Life, and Logic: 
Investigations after Wittgenstein, Berlin – Boston 2018, 93-112. For more on how our ethical 
relations with intelligent machines are bound up with our social relations with them and on how 
the social world is itself enabled and constrained by the physical world, and by the biological 
features of living social participants, see S. torrance, «Artificial consciousness and artificial 
ethics: between realism and social relationism», Philosophy & Technology 27 (2014) 9–29; 
DOI: 10.1007/s13347-013-0136-5.
31 An important legal point here is that, when we have a high degree of anthropomorphic 
representation, as in humanoid robots engaged in social life, people are likely to impute to the 
machine more competence than it deserves. This could make the manufacturers liable because 
the situation could amount to deceit. The robot could be in fact a misrepresentation made with 
the express intention of defrauding someone. This point shows how important it is for us to 
ensure that legal liability standards remain in pace with evolving technology. See C. heckman 
– J.O. woBBrock, «Liability for Autonomous Agent Design», Autonomous Agents and Multi-
Agent Systems 2/1 (1999) 87-103; DOI: 10.1023/A:1010087325358.
32 This point is made in P.M.S. hacker, Wittgenstein (cf. nt. 27), 170. Some convincing arguments, 
however, show that even the first step, namely to produce a mechanical organism, is impossible. See 
M. schark, «Synthetic biology and the distinction between organisms and machines», Environmental 
Values 21/1, special issue on Synthetic Biology, (2012) 19-41. The way people are ready to attribute 
emotions and other personal attributes to robots is the central interest of P. Dumouchel – L. Damiano, 
Living with Robots (cf. nt. 4). It is a pity that this book remains detached from the considerable 
advances made these last decades in the area of philosophy of meaning. 
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These arguments point clearly to the following conclusion. It is not true 
that, if an entity functions like a person in some restricted sense, for example 
as regards linguistic skills only, then it deserves personhood in some sense. 
This conclusion is an invitation for us to retrieve the richness of pre-Cartesian 
philosophical anthropology according to which the person is not made up of 
two separate substances body and soul but is, on the contrary, a unity that can 
be appreciated both from the material viewpoint and from the intellectual or 
spiritual viewpoint. This is the valuable heritage of Aristotle and Aquinas. The 
specifically human form of life, which we use as a criterion for the correct 
attribution of personhood, includes not only endo-somatic relations, those 
between one part and another part of the body, but also exo-somatic relations, 
those connecting the entity to things outside it. The brain functions not on its 
own but in constant symbiosis with the entire body. Likewise, the person, the 
unity of mind and body, operates not on its own but in constant symbiosis with 
the entire social and cultural relational space that makes rationality possible33. 
To appreciate better the benefits of the position defended so far, it is helpful 
to consider a major philosophical objection that has been levelled against 
it. Daniel Dennett criticized this position severely by arguing that semantic 
rules of grammar seem fixed but are not really so34. For him, these rules are 
nothing more than collective habits. They are nothing more than the result of 
human interaction with the environment over millennia, rules that ensure a 
stable and useful production of human sounds. He disagrees with those who 
see grammatical rules as logically compelling. For him, the entire network of 
rules is just a feature of human social life, a feature that should be the object 
of study for anthropologists, not logicians. When radical changes occur within 
society, some of these rules may be revised to achieve better overall efficiency. 
Dennett is moreover convinced that the emergence of highly intelligent and 
autonomous machines represents precisely such a radical change that demands 
a revision. It justifies the use of expressions that we have traditionally banned, 
expressions like «this machine understands» or «this machine is a person»35.
33 Christian theology highlights these same fundamental principles. The Catechism of the 
Catholic Church, Vatican City – London 1994, summarizes the theological concept of «soul» in 
the following way. «In Sacred Scripture, the term ‘soul’ often refers to human life or the entire 
human person. But ‘soul’ also refers to the innermost aspect of man, that which is of greatest 
value in him» (§363; italics in the original). Also: «spirit and matter, in man, are not two natures 
united, but rather their union forms a single nature» (§365). These two quotations show how a 
naïve Cartesian dualism is foreign to the correct theological understanding of the soul.
34 See M. Bennett – al., Neuroscience and Philosophy: Brain, Mind, and Language, New 
York 2007.
35 For a study on how Dennett’s stance is applicable to questions regarding the moral status 
of robots, see S. choPra, «Taking the moral stance: morality, robots, and the intentional stance», 
in B. van Den BerG – L. klaminG, ed., Technologies on the stand: Legal and ethical questions 
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This criticism, in its apparent defense of human freedom as regards the use 
of words, may seem very attractive. Nevertheless, it rests on an oversight. For 
any kind of scientist or anthropologist, the sense of a hypothesis must be settled 
before he or she could determine whether that hypothesis is true or false. For 
a string of words to make sense, one needs to respect a set of rules. Only then 
can scientists conduct their inquiry to decide about the truth or falsity of what is 
proposed. If neuroscientists or legal experts want to change the rules regarding 
the word «person», they need to realize that such a change generates conceptual 
repercussions elsewhere. When a rule is revised, it will produce a ripple effect 
that could go right across the entire conceptual landscape, an effect that may 
cause confusion. The new rules could for instance have detrimental effects on 
the use of that same word in everyday contexts. Such scientists therefore would 
do well to be aware of the need to reestablish consistency across the entire range 
of human experience and not only in their own specialized semantic space. 
As an example of how inconsistency and conceptual confusion could 
emerge, consider the hidden links between personal attributes and ethical 
concepts. Amelie Rorty in a short paper published more than fifty years 
ago but still relevant today, exposed how «the word ‘think’ is not only used 
descriptively, but also implies an ethical decision or attitude»36. Her argument 
is about the use of «think» as applied to machines. To decide whether we 
could correctly speak of a machine as thinking, the Turing Test implies that, 
out of all the possible forms of human behavior, one specific form determines 
whether a machine thinks or not. Rorty rightly points out however that when 
I say, «This X thinks», I am not only describing its behavior. I am also saying 
something about myself. I am saying something about the proper behavior I 
should have towards X. I am saying something about showing respect towards 
X, about treating X with dignity. Rorty here is encouraging us to explore the 
broad conceptual network associated with crucial expressions like «to think», 
«to respect», and «to treat as a person». These conceptual areas merge into 
one another. It is incorrect to use «to think» without the ethical overtones that 
go with it. What lies behind this overlap between conceptual spaces is not just 
descriptive but also prescriptive. It is prescriptive in the sense that it indicates 
what I ought to do. For instance, in a geriatric ward, I treat this person in front 
of me with dignity even though his thinking is confused. Of course, I could 
neglect this ethical imperative. I could even be brainwashed to treat no one with 
dignity. The fact that we disapprove of such neglect, however, shows that we 
in neuroscience and robotics, Nijmegen 2011, 285-295. Chopra argues that, when an artificial 
agent’s behavior is of a certain kind, it merits our ascribing to it a moral sense. The paper 
however does not consider the broader conceptual issues, e.g. problems that arise when the 
corresponding responsibility ascribed to machines is used to exonerate humans.
36 A.O. rorty, «Slaves and Machines», Analysis 22/5 (1962) 118-120; the quote is from p. 120.
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indeed recognize the imperative. Rorty rightly exposes therefore the inevitable 
conceptual links between the two conceptual spaces, the one associated with 
thinking and the other corresponding to some fundamental and non-negotiable 
attitudes within human living. The upshot is that claiming that robots think, 
understand, decide and are indeed persons has wide consequences in our life 
in general including our moral attitudes. 
Probably, philosophers like Dennett would not find this compelling. They 
would claim that such links between descriptive and normative expressions 
are not as untouchable as we are assuming. They would probably argue that it 
is perfectly possible to tear apart the conceptual fabric right there, on the fault 
line between thinking and respecting as a person. If we start using personal 
attributes without their ethical overtones, what then? 
In that case, the situation will be like changing the rules of an established game. 
Suppose we start playing chess and then we decide to change the rules. Would 
we still be playing chess? Given that the game is defined in terms of its rules, 
the answer is no. We would have introduced a new game or a new type of chess. 
We would have chess according to the old rules and chess according to the new 
rules, two separate games. Analogously, a change in semantic and grammatical 
rules would produce a complex situation in which a word means one thing in 
one context and another thing in another context. For instance, it would have 
ethical implications in one context and no ethical implications in another. Both 
contexts could enjoy internal consistency but the speaker would need to acquire 
the skill of switching from one context to the other. This leads to fragmentation of 
language and eventually of culture itself, as described by Jean-François Lyotard 
in his study of post-modernism37. Is this is a healthy way forward for humanity? 
As faster communication, more efficient travel, and global concerns are helping 
us to grow into a global community, favoring the conditions for the realization of 
a truly universal family, it would be self-defeating to encourage fragmentation at 
the conceptual level. 
Could we perhaps just wait and see what happens? In the name of new 
technology, we inflict conceptual lacerations onto the semantic fabric that was 
meant to keep our understanding as self-consistent as possible. Could we just 
wait for these lacerations to heal on their own? Some researchers have indeed 
advocated such an approach, which we could call pragmatic. Lawrence Solum 
for instance argues that we do not need to waste our time now to figure out 
beforehand whether or not we should attribute legal personhood to intelligent 
machines in the future. When the time comes, when machines will reach a 
high level of intelligence and autonomy, when they will have a will of their 
own, then, Solum argues, we will see how society reacts. We will see how 
society adjusts itself. This approach is pragmatic in the sense that it assumes 
37 J.-F. lyotarD, La condition postmoderne : rapport sur le savoir, Paris 1979.
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a kind of invisible hand that guides us always towards the optimal situation38. 
It implies that we should concentrate on what works well as regards our 
immediate needs and should avoid the deeper metaphysical question of 
whether machines really have awareness, intention, or understanding. This 
assumption may seem reasonable but, in fact, is misleading. It leads to no 
solution at all. Trust in providence is a very cheap excuse for a laissez-faire 
mentality. The invisible hand that alleged guides humanity has not always 
resulted in the optimal situation. Far from it. Without deliberate, responsible 
and courageous decisions, based upon the attentive consideration of the future 
consequences of our action, chances are that humanity will just spin out 
of control and fall into the hands of demagogues. The pragmatic approach 
therefore is not convincing. It cannot revoke the duty to think ahead. It cannot 
substitute a responsible, detailed study of the way shifts of meaning in one 
area of our conceptual scheme could affect meaning in other areas, causing 
confused thinking and problematic legal practice39.
conclusion
The intricate set of mutually dependent questions discussed in this paper 
constitute a broad issue that will be with us for decades. The paper has limited 
itself to a philosophical evaluation of one area only. Philosophy, of course, is 
no substitute for natural science or for technological innovation. The research 
efforts of these last decades in the areas of cognitive neuroscience and robotics 
have been enormous. The resourcefulness, creativity and care represented by 
such collaborative research undoubtedly demands respect. Philosophy is here 
a partner with a specific role. It contributes by being attentive to conceptual 
38 I use here the expression invisible hand with explicit reference to Adam Smith’s famous 
use of it in the context of economics. Just as Smith assumed that the stability of the system is 
guaranteed by an invisible hand, even though the individual agents act in their own self interest, 
so also the pragmatist view described here assumes that logical consistency is guaranteed 
even if semantic changes are allowed without any concern about the overall picture. There 
are plausible reasons to hold that Smith used the expression in a religious sense because of 
his admiration for Isaac Newton. See for instance P. oslinGton, «God and the Market: Adam 
Smith’s Invisible Hand», Journal of Business Ethics 108/4 (2012) 429-438.
39 I am not advocating radical semantic conservatism at any price. Cultural, technological and 
intellectual novelty is to be supported, even though it is nearly always associated with neologisms. 
What I am advocating is caution and responsibility in this area. Not all neologisms are beneficial or 
neutral. Sometimes they can have damaging consequences, even when accepted by the majority. 
As an example think of how the expression Lebensunwerten Lebens (a life unworthy of life) was 
one of the catchphrases during the Nazi era (in use between 1920 and 1944), with devastating 
legal consequences involving the unrestricted killing of innumerable vulnerable human subjects.
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links and by identifying any problematic transgressions of the bounds of 
sense. In this task, it is concerned not with matters of fact regarding the 
material world but rather with matters of meaning. It is concerned, in other 
words, with facts about rules for understanding. Philosophy can help to reveal 
and correct those conceptual confusions and misconceptions that sometimes 
emerge because of changes in culture and everyday life. 
This paper’s overall result can be summarized in three points. First, it showed 
that a very liberal use of personal attributes to describe non-human entities, 
attributes involving intelligence, understanding, willing and personhood, is 
detrimental, especially if we use such words univocally. Negligence in this 
area undermines conceptual consistency because it disregards very important 
normative nuances that these attributes have. It should be clear by now 
therefore that the expression «intelligent machines» carries nuances that could 
be misguiding. Perhaps a better designation would be one that highlighted the 
fact that these machines, like all other machines, are instruments for our use. 
They are sophisticated electro-mechanical instruments, tools to help us with 
our entertainment, our intelligence, our understanding, our willing and our 
personhood. 
Secondly, society may indeed persist in its misconceptions and may indeed 
end up attributing legal personhood to machines. It would thereby neglect how 
concepts relate to each other and would assume that the conceptual scheme will 
somehow heal itself through the action of an invisible hand. This paper argued 
that such a move would be severely irresponsible. Even in this case however, 
we would still be obliged to distinguish between what is human and what is 
not. The distinction between human and artificial intelligence, or that between 
human and artificial person, would remain inevitable. We would probably start 
using expressions like «human person» as distinct from «machine person». 
We would probably start saying that the intelligent machine is like us in 
everything except for being human. There is a deep desire within us to defend 
our identity40. We naturally insist that no amount of simulation would ever be 
enough to justify complete equality between humans and machines. This deep 
desire to defend our human specificity reflects the fundamental distinction 
between the categories of natural and artificial, between φύσις and τέχνη, a 
distinction that cannot be overruled. 
And thirdly, as regards the specific question of machines as legal persons, 
the paper has made it clear that there could be a hidden agenda. The most 
dangerous aspect is the possible hidden agenda of wanting a kind of legal 
machinery to exculpate the real perpetrators when things go wrong. To be 
prepared for dealing with wrongs committed by machines, we should not 
create a legal fiction that could serve as a shelter for wrongdoers. We should 
40 Cf. L.B. solum, «Legal Personhood» (cf. nt. 15).
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rather invest the necessary time and energy to clarify the various forms of 
accountability for complex cases where responsibility is distributed among 
many agents41. Blaming the machine is not the way forward42.
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To describe computers and sophisticated robots, many people today have no problem 
using personal attributes. Alan Turing published his famous intelligence test in 1950. 
From that time onwards, computers have gained increasingly higher status in this 
regard. Computers and robots nowadays are not only intelligent. They perceive, they 
remember, they understand, they decide, they play and so on. Recently, another such 
step has occurred but, this time, many researchers are seriously concerned. In February 
2017, the European Parliament passed a Resolution to attribute legal personhood to 
intelligent robots. If this is accepted as law, it will have very serious consequences 
for our self-understanding and for the way we live together as a community. The 
EU Resolution has stimulated various studies, arising mainly from the area of legal 
studies. It is urgent that the response include also a philosophical evaluation regarding 
the fundamental concepts at play. This paper seeks to make a contribution precisely 
in this area. It explores the attribution of legal personhood to machines by focusing 
on what is happening at the level of meaning. It explores crucial concepts like 
responsibility, autonomy, person and quasi-person by drawing inspiration from the 
seminal works of Aristotle and L. Wittgenstein and from the ensuing debates between 
current philosophers like P. Hacker and D. Dennett. The results of this paper indicate 
what dangers could lie ahead and what could be the right way to avoid them. 
Keywords: artificial intelligence, legal person, autonomy, robot, Wittgenstein
RIASSUNTO
Per descrivere computer e robot sofisticati, molte persone oggi usano senza nessun 
scrupolo attributi personali. Alan Turing pubblicò il suo famoso test di intelligence 
nel 1950. Da quel momento in poi, i computer hanno acquisito uno status sempre 
41 This is one of the points advocated by U. PanGallo, «Vital, Sophia and Co.» (cf. nt. 23). 
42 Previous drafts of this paper were presented and discussed during the Congreso Internacional de 
Filosofía de la Mente, held at Morelia, Mexico (25-27 March 2019) and during the Transhumanism 
Conference, held at the University of Comillas Madrid, Spain (29-31 May 2019). Thanks are due 
to all those who helped by their questions and suggestions during these conferences, and also to an 
anonymous referee for Gregorianum. 
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più elevato in questo senso. I computer e robot al giorno d’oggi non sono soltanto 
intelligenti ma anche percepiscono, ricordano, comprendono, decidono, giocano e 
così via. Di recente si è verificato un altro passo del genere, ma questa volta molti 
ricercatori sono seriamente preoccupati. Nel febbraio 2017, il Parlamento Europeo ha 
approvato una risoluzione per attribuire la personalità giuridica ai robot intelligenti. 
Se questo è accettato come legge, avrà conseguenze molto serie riguardanti il modo 
in cui noi comprendiamo noi stessi e il modo in cui viviamo insieme come comunità. 
La risoluzione dell’UE ha stimolato vari studi, associati principalmente agli studi 
giuridici. È urgente che la risposta includa anche una valutazione filosofica relativa 
ai concetti fondamentali in gioco. Questo articolo cerca di dare un contributo proprio 
in questo settore. Esplora l’attribuzione della personalità giuridica alle macchine 
concentrandosi su ciò che sta accadendo al livello del significato. Esplora concetti 
cruciali come la responsabilità, l’autonomia, la persona e la quasi-persona, traendo 
ispirazione dalle opere fondamentali di Aristotele e di L. Wittgenstein e dai conseguenti 
dibattiti tra filosofi attuali come P. Hacker e D. Dennett. I risultati di questa indagine 
indicano quali pericoli potrebbero presentarsi e quale potrebbe essere il modo giusto 
per evitarli.
Parole chiave: intelligenza artificiale, personalità giuridica, autonomia, robot, 
Wittgenstein
